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Trust reduces uncertainty, improves cooperation, promotes efficient transactions, and 
contributes to positive organisational outcomes. Trust between exchange parties is 
traditionally monitored by escrows, third party certification and regulatory bodies 
(Shapiro 1987, Zucker 1986). However, there is little research that focuses on 
monitoring and guarding trust when two new agents are involved in an exchange and 
little historical information exists.  
 
Building on Shapiro’s (1987) notion of ‘guardians of trust’ in agency relationships, 
this study proposes a model of how mass media serve as guardians of trust in a time 
of crisis. This model is built around mass mediated exchanges between the Australian 
federal health minister and the Australian Medical Association president to resolve a 
policy crisis at a time when both agents were new to their roles and thus brought very 
little historical information to their exchanges. Through role framing, the study shows 
how the mass media acted as a guardian of trust and also set expectations for an 
agent amongst principals. Finally, this paper poses a set of research initiatives based 









Trust is a critical element in all principal-agent relationships, where an agent acts on 
behalf of principals in political, social and financial exchanges. Within these 
relationships, Shapiro suggests that in order to proceed, both parties require 
impersonal trust, that is, trust built without personal history (Shapiro 1987). 
Impersonal trust, implicit in nature, overcomes the difficulties principals face in 
monitoring their agents, and exists without access to complete information (Miller & 
Whitford 2002). 
  
Common definitions of trust account for vulnerability of actors and uncertainty 
(Gambetta 1988). Mayer, Davis & Schoorman (1995, p. 712) argue that people trust 
even without the ‘ability to monitor or control that other party’. Although 
vulnerability is recognised as part of trust, Shapiro introduced guardians of trust, who 
act to preserve trust on behalf of parties and thus overcome issues associated with 
vulnerability (Shapiro 1987). Set within principal-agency theory, traditional guardians 
of trust are institutions including government or professional associations and private 
entrepreneurs (Zucker 1986). Although recent studies in principal-agency theory have 
been undertaken in non-traditional settings, studies of guardians of trust are limited. 
This paper sets out to define and place trust in principal-agency relationships and 





Broadly, trust is a belief, in the absence of any evidence, that things will work out 
(Gambetta 1988). Although trust has been defined in many ways, sociology, 
management, economic, and psychology literatures identify three key variables 
affecting trust: risk (Boyd 2003, Luhmann 1988), opportunism (Cummings & 
Bromiley 1996, Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence 1998), and willingness (McEvily, 
Perrone, & Zaheer 2003, Mishra 1996).  
 
According to Mayer et al (1995, p. 712), trust is defined as the ‘willingness of a party 
to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other 
will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to 
monitor or control that other party’. In this definition, Mayer et al (1995) set trust 
apart from other constructs including cooperation, confidence, and distrust. Rosseau, 
Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer's (1998, p. 123) definition of trust as a ‘psychological state 
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of 
the intentions or behaviour of another’ is commonly accepted in management 
literature. However, Mayer et al’s (1995) reference to monitoring is particularly 
significant to this study of impersonal trust in principal-agent relationships.  
 
Trust exists as both a personal and an impersonal phenomenon. According to Lane 
(1998, p. 12), impersonal trust exists when organisational actors cannot ‘rely on 
commonality of personal characteristics or a past history or guaranteed future of 
exchange’. This view is supported by Zucker’s (1986) treatment of institutional-based 
trust, which suggests that socially produced and legitimated structures guarantee trust 
and Luhmann (1988) who argues that impersonal trust underwrites interpersonal trust. 
Common mechanisms for impersonal trust are political legitimacy and systems of 
technical and professional knowledge, which are used to guarantee individual 
expectations (Lane 1998). When personal information is scarce, it is common to enter 
into relationships and draw conclusions using impersonal cues.  
 
In principal-agent relationships, both parties work from an impersonal basis. Building 
from this foundation, Shapiro (1987) describes process and importance of impersonal 
trust: 
Impersonal trust arises when social-control measures derived from social 
ties and direct contact between the principal and agent are unavailable… 
 when faceless and readily interchangeable individual or organisational 
agents exercise considerable delegated power and privilege on behalf of 
principals who can neither specify, scrutinize, evaluate, nor constrain their 
performance (p. 634). 
 
This investigation was motivated to understand how principals control their agents 
through mechanisms associated with impersonal trust. The role of impersonal trust in 
principal-agent relationships is discussed below. 
 
 
Trust monitoring in principal-agent relationships  
 
Defining principal-agent relationships 
 
Traditional principal-agent relationships focus on exchange and incorporate hierarchy 
(Olson 2000), delegation (Beccerra & Gupta 1999, Castelfranchi & Falcone 1998, 
Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz 2001), and contracts (Schulze et al 2001). 
However, recent studies have been undertaken in non-traditional settings including 
retail (Singh & Sirdeshmukh 2000), public administration (Miller & Whitford 2002), 
religious institutions (Zech 2001), and family business (Schulze et al 2001). 
 
Trust is a critical element in all principal-agent relationships, where according to 
Shapiro (1987, p. 626) ‘principals—for whatever reason or state of mind—invest 
resources, authority, or responsibility in another [agent] to act on their behalf for some 
uncertain future return’. In so trusting agents, principals bear risks. Given this 
existence of risk as well as an understanding ‘that all individuals are self-serving and 
boundedly rational’ (Olson 2000, p. 280), Miller and Whitford (2002) claim principal-
agency theory grew out of a concern for corporate accountability. 
 
Broadly, principals assume the risk of delegation of tasks to an agent and cannot 
observe the agent’s efforts in completing such tasks (Beccerra & Gupta 1999, Miller 
& Whitford 2002, Shapiro 1987, Zech 2001). As such, principals ‘entrust agents to 
bridge the barriers of direct physical access to information and property’ (Shapiro 
1987, p. 627). Singh and Sirdeshmukh (2000, p. 152) argue that market signals are 
‘sufficient devices to overcome information asymmetry and favour ongoing 
exchanges’. Although principals cannot measure the agent’s efforts, they can make 
inferences based on the outcome, which is a combination of both the agent’s actions 
and external factors (Miller & Whitford 2002). 
 
To preserve and maximise outcomes within the principal-agency relationship, 
Eisenhardt (1989 as cited in Creed & Miles 1996, p. 23) focuses on the use of 
‘organisational controls and incentives to combat the purported tendency of agents to 
engage in suboptimal and/or self-serving behaviours’. In protecting themselves, 
principals must encourage agents to achieve positive outcomes even if the process 
cannot be monitored or directly rewarded (Miller & Whitford 2002). 
 
 
Establishing trust as a control mechanism in principal-agent relationships 
 
 Trust is one mechanism of organisational control and responds to the opportunism 
bias in agency theory (Creed & Miles 1996). This view is shared by Beccerra and 
Gupta (1999) who recommend principals and agents establish an environment of trust, 
and Singh and Sirdeshmukh (2000) who view trust as a critical variable in agency 
relationships. According to Beccerra and Gupta (1999), agency theory is a useful 
vehicle to study and understand the production of impersonal trust, particularly in 
situations where lack of trust is relatively high and information is relatively low. Lane 
(1998) suggests that trust bridges uncertainty in situations of imperfect information. 
Singh and Sirdeshmukh (2000) suggest that in low information situations, agency 
mechanisms may dominate and as access to personal information increases, 
principals’ reliance on agency devices is replaced by personal trust expectations. 
 
Trust between agents and principals promotes exchange (Mishra 1996, Tyler & 
Degoey 1996), and produces beneficial outcomes for both parties (Singh & 
Sirdeshmukh 2000). Given this importance for trust, principals must also look to 
insure trust in their relationships with agents. 
 
Examining ‘guardians of trust’ 
 
Acknowledging the necessity and benefits of trust, several studies have deliberated on 
the insurance or protection of trust (see Bachman 1998, Gambetta 1988, Lane 1998, 
Shapiro 1987, Tyler & Kramer 1996, Zucker 1986). The vulnerability of principals in 
situations of impersonal trust led Shapiro (1987, p. 635) to introduce guardians of 
trust. Principals rely on the trustees or guardians of trust, ‘a supporting social-control 
framework of procedural norms, organisational forms, and social-control specialists, 
which institutionalise distrust’. Guardians of trust, sometimes referred to as trustees, 
assume the role of principals, acting on their behalf, to monitor agents (Shapiro 1987). 
 
Traditional guardians of trust are institutions such as government or professional 
associations as well as agents and private entrepreneurs (Shapiro 1987, Zucker 1986). 
For example, professional bodies use membership or accreditation to monitor the 
performance of and hold accountable the actions of its members who operate in 
positions of trust (Shapiro 1987). From an economic perspective, Williamson (1994 
as cited in Aldrich 1999) identified several substitutes for trust including bonds, 
hostages, disclosure rules, and agreements on how disputes will be resolved. 
However, although he acknowledged the importance of these procedures, he 
suggested these substitutions offer no comparison to real trust. In extending this 
argument, Mishra (1996) argues that even if formal contracts are used, effective 
relationships depend on trust. 
 
Although recent research on guardians of trust is limited, Ayios (2003) examined the 
monitoring of trust in new international business relationships. Monitoring is defined 
as the preference of one party ‘to closely regulate and monitor the relationship 
through reliance on formal processes, contracting, assumptions and behaviours’ 
(Ayios 2003, p. 193). This cross-cultural study showed that monitoring, when 
undertaken at the expense of interpersonal processes, produces conflict and distrust 
(Ayios 2003). Similarly, Barney and Hansen (1994 as cited in Lane 1998) argue that 
if a variety of governance mechanisms are adopted to deter opportunism, only weak 
trust may develop. 
 
 Guardians of trust, like the principals they represent, require information from agents. 
The task of information collection and dissemination is entrusted to agents (Shapiro 
1987). All parties rely on news media, research or advertising to build knowledge 
relevant to their relationship and exchange situation.  
 
 
The mass media as a guardian of trust in a time of crisis 
 
In non-traditional principal-agency relationships and without related guardians of 
trust, such as contracts, escrows, and regulatory bodies, this study proposes that mass 
media act as guardians of trust. This proposal is based on three criteria for guardians 
of trust. Guardians of trust are grounded in institutional norms (Shapiro 1987, Zucker 
1986), able to access information (Ayios 2003, Shapiro 1987, Zucker 1986), and 
active monitors of agents on behalf of principals (Shapiro 1987). The mass media 
meet the first two of these criteria. First, in social systems, the media have long been 
established and taken for granted as a reporting and news-sharing institution in social 
systems. Second, based on this institutional legitimacy, the mass media gain access to 
information through the reporting process and are recognised as a traditional source of 
information for agents, principals and even traditional guardians of trust (Shapiro 
1987). Answering mass media’s contribution to the third function of guardians of 
trust, monitoring agents on behalf of principals, is the focus of this study. This third 
criterion has a direct relationship to impersonal trust.  
 
The following model (Figure 1) illustrates the role of mass media as a guardian or 
monitor of trust in relationships between principals and an agent. As discussed earlier, 
these relationships often rely upon impersonal trust. Overseeing these relationships 
and guarding for such trust is the guardian of trust, in this case, the mass media. Mass 
media are posited to have an impersonal connection to the principal-agent 
relationship. That is, the mass media, although not connected directly to an agent or 
principals, can be an indirect source of information pertaining to the relationship 
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 This model gains legitimacy when set within a crisis and when an agent is new to 
his/her role. A crisis is defined by Barton (1993 as cited in Baker 2001, p. 513) as ‘a 
major unpredictable event that has potentially negative results…and may significantly 
damage an organisation and its employees, products, services, financial condition, and 
reputation’. During a crisis, mass media are a common communication tool between 
organisations and publics (Grunig & Hunt 1984), thus meeting a guardian of trust 
criterion of providing access to information. Mass media framing of crises can affect 
stakeholder perceptions of organisations, and, as such, principal-agent relationships 
benefit when information is communicated clearly (Mishra 1996).  
 
In a time of crisis, Thomas (1998) argues that trust can fluctuate during role changes. 
Stated conversely, principal-agent relationships can maintain trust through role 
stability. Role reorganisations increase opportunities for actual violations of trust 
which often results in lower levels of trust (Thomas 1998). Roles, and the 
expectations, actions and violations, associated with them will be used to orient this 
study. The mass media’s reporting of such roles and monitoring of agents will be used 
to answer these research questions. 
 
RQ1: How does the mass media report established roles of agents? 
 






This study proposes that the framing of mass mediated exchanges is the basis of mass 
media’s role as a guardian of trust. Given its relationship to crises, the study has 
operationalised mass media’s framing of roles as indicators of its guardianship of 
trust. 
 
Framing is a technique used to structure disparate pieces of information into a 
meaningful structure. The concept of framing was first applied by Goffman (1974, as 
cited in Simon & Xenos 2000). Since that time, it has been applied to understand the 
role of journalists and analyse political communication. Framing is defined as ‘a 
central organising idea or storyline that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of 
events, weaving a connection among them’ where ‘the frame suggests what the 
controversy is about, the essence of the issue’ (Gamson & Modigliani 1987, p. 143, as 
cited in Nelson & Kinder 1996). 
 
The literature describes framing as having both content and structural impact. Nelson, 
Clawson and Oxley (1997, p. 1) argue that framing examines the ‘effects of media 
content rather than mere coverage of a problem. From a structural perspective, 
Entman (1993 as cited in Nelson & Kinder 1996) defines framing as the ‘process by 
which a communication source, such as a news organisation, defines and constructs a 
political issue or public controversy’. According to Simon and Xenos (2000), framing 
also involves association or linking concepts within the discourse. Nelson et al (1997) 
argue that frames reduce issue complexity by narrowing discussion to one or two 
central aspects. 
  
Framing means and achieves more than organising content. According to Nelson et al 
(1997, p. 2), by emphasising particular messages, frames ‘shape individual 
understanding and opinion concerning an issue’. Nelson and Kinder (1996, p. 1055) 
extended this argument and claimed that framing of issues also ‘shapes public 
understanding of…the merits of alternative solutions’. As such, they claim that issue 
framing affects public opinion (Nelson & Kinder 1996). This approach to mass media 
framing supports the proposal that mass media have an impersonal connection 
between principals and agents.  
 
This study is examined through media coverage of the medical indemnity crisis in 
Australia. Medical indemnity has continued to be a significant issue for medical 
practitioners, the federal government, and other stakeholders in Australia. In April 
2002, Australia’s largest medical indemnity organisation, United Medical Protection 
(UMP), filed for bankruptcy, affecting negatively the legal protection of more than 60 
percent of Australian doctors. The Australian Medical Association (AMA) called for 
government assistance to protect its members against existing and future medical 
claims and threatened strike action. In response, the federal government agreed to 
protect doctors against existing claims, and some state governments changed personal 
liability and legal services advertising legislation in an attempt to reduce future 
claims. This debate was waged between the federal health minister and AMA 
president. In late 2003, new agents were appointed to these roles. A federal 
government cabinet review saw Mr Tony Abbott move from the workplace relations 
portfolio to become the federal health minister and Dr William Glasson was elected 
AMA president. These appointments saw both men become agents for the principals 
of voters and medical practitioners, respectively. This study selects the agent-principal 
relationship represented by federal health minister Tony Abbott and the general 
public. In representing the public interest, the federal health minister is securing 




The unit of observation for this study is newspaper clippings. Newspapers were 
selected to represent “mass media” as they provide a detailed source of content from 
which to explore the research question. A search of the Lexis-Nexis database of major 
Australian newspapers identified 88 articles containing the words “Glasson” and 
“Abbott”, the two agents involved in the medical indemnity crisis. These two search 
keys were selected to examine an exchange relationship restricted to the medical 
indemnity issue. 
 
Articles were clipped from 29 September to 10 October 2003 inclusive. The start date 
for media clippings was selected to identify the role changes associated with one 
agent’s appointment to a new federal government portfolio. The end date reflected the 
reporting of an outcome to negotiations between the two agents. Clippings were 
limited to national and capital city newspapers including The Australian, The 
Weekend Australian, The Courier-Mail (Brisbane), The Canberra Times, The Sydney 
Morning Herald, and The Age (Melbourne). 
 
 
Data analysis and coding 
 
 To shed light on the research questions, this study used a three-step process of data 
analysis. First, following Simon and Xenos’ (2000) framing methodology, an initial 
analysis of media coverage identified “working frames” or broad content themes that 
reflected the consecutive development of the issue. Second, based on these working 
frames, a content analysis identified role frames or sites where mass media structure 
news around content referring to the roles of key actors in an exchange. Third, these 
role frames became a platform for the investigation of trust guardianship, which was 
examined through mass media’s identification of roles and treatment of role violation 
and reification. These role frames were used to signify cases where mass media 
monitored an agent on behalf of principals and therefore acted as a guardian of trust. 
This approach to mass media framing supports the proposed model’s assertion of 




Although similar to other news framing studies, the timeframe for this study limits a 
detailed exploration of trust monitoring. Further, investigation of mass media’s role in 
trust guardianship is limited only to those principal-agent cases deemed newsworthy 
by the mass media. 
 
Case study description 
 
Mass media reporting of established agent roles 
 
The mass media served as an impersonal information source for principals. Within the 
first working frame, 30 articles reported changes to the federal government cabinet. 
Of these 30 articles, 10 used role frames to describe to principals the characteristics of 
their agent and new federal health minister, Mr Abbott. The mass media’s framing of 
Abbott’s reputation as a ‘political bruiser’ coupled with his ‘can-do’ approach was 
based largely on his previous role as workplace relations and employment minister 
and is described in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Identifying established roles for an agent  
Role frames Case examples 
Established roles for 
agent  
• Mr Abbott arrives from his union-busting activities as Workplace 
Relations Minister 
• Renowned political bruiser Tony Abbott will be guided by a social 
conscience to fix the ailing health system. 
• Mr Abbott’s tough approach to workplace reform meant union 
leaders were happy to see the back of him 
• Former boxer Tony Abbott will jump into the ring to tackle Labor 
head-on… he is the government’s hard man and one of their 
toughest players 
• Trusted confidant of the Prime Minster and certainly a spear 
carrier 
• He’s a head-kicker 
• …notorious bruising debating style… 
• Mr Abbott should also know that enhancing his reputation as a 
“can-do” politician will be less important to voters than the 
philosophy he will bring to his new position.  
 
  
These role frames capture and communicate professional and personal characteristics 
of the principal, Abbott, to his agents as well as other stakeholders in healthcare. 
 
 
Mass media acting as guardian of trust in principal-agent relationships 
 
After reporting the historical roles of Abbott, the media also projected roles for 
Abbott in negotiations with key health stakeholders. These role projections saw the 
mass media establish expectations amongst principals for change within their newly 
appointed agent (see Table 2.1). Reports of role projections were established by 
journalists as well as other health stakeholders including the AMA.  
 
Table 2.1: Role projections for an agent as reported by the mass media 
Role frames Case examples 
Projected roles for 
agent 
• He will take a much more conciliatory approach to health than is 
his usual style 
• Abbott…is compelling, thoughtful, and many hope, controversial 
enough to provoke some good debate about health policy 
• …Mr Abbott’s fighting instinct would win a better deal or patients 
 
The role discussion reported in Table 2.1 occurred soon after the announcement of 
Abbott’s appointment as federal health minister. However, within a few days of this 
announcement, doctors threatened strike action and resignation over the medical 
indemnity levies. As an agent for voters and healthcare consumers, Abbott entered 
negotiations with the AMA president. Within this working frame, 52 articles were 
printed. Twenty of these articles employed role framing. In 10 articles, mass media 
framed roles in conflict with those established in the first working frame but in 
support of role projections established by journalists and other healthcare 
stakeholders. The role reification for the agent is described in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2: Role reification of an agent as reported by the mass media 
Role frames Case examples 
Role reification • He [Abbott] had to be seen to act. By giving doctors a bit of slack 
Abbott has won some goodwill with the profession that he’ll need 
to help solve the Government’s other health problem, the rising 
cost of visiting a doctor. 
• Three days into his tenure as Health Minister, and Tony Abbott far 
from playing a head-kicker role, is all consultation and 
compromise. 
• A conciliatory Tony Abbott yesterday showered praise on the 
medical profession as he moved to defuse the crisis over medical 
indemnity insurance. 
• Tony Abbott’s transformation from political headkicker to a 
caring, listening Mr Fixit started yesterday. He did it by casting off 
his confrontationalist style and talking to the doctors. 
• Mr Abbott was close to conceding the doctors’ two key demands 
after twice meeting with AMA president…. 
• The former boxer...immediately found himself acting as referee in 
a complex fight about the right way forward for medical 
indemnity in Australia’s health care system.  
• So far, the minister has sounded conciliatory, conceding the 
medical indemnity insurance system needs thorough review. No 
doubt he also will seek to remind the AMA that doctors cannot 
expect to enjoy the full protection from legal action for 
 negligence, and part of the problem has resulted from actions by 
the profession’s own medical protection fund, UMP. 
 
 
In reporting the actions and decisions of the federal health minister, the mass media 
questioned both his decisions and decision-making ability against his established 
reputation. It is through the mass media’s identification of the inconsistent role traits 
displayed by the agent that the media act as a guardian of trust. Although the reified 
role traits displayed in Table 2.2 conflict with the historical roles of the agent, it is 
interesting to note that they hold consistent with the role projections reported in Table 
2.1. 
 
Shortly after reporting these roles and actions, the media commented on a second role 
reification, which saw the agent return to role traits consistent with roles established 
in Table 1. In five articles, the mass media framed roles in symmetry with those 
established in the first working frame, calling on Abbott to “not bend over 
backwards” to doctors’ requests (see Table 2.3).  
 
Table 2.3: Agent’s return to original roles as reported by the mass media 
Role frames Case examples 
Reversal of role 
reification 
• …Tony Abbott was heading for a showdown with Sydney’s 200 
rebelling public hospital doctors last night, insisting he would 
make no concessions “under duress” on the escalating medical 
indemnity dispute. 
• …may have toughened the stance  by Mr Abbott, who had taken a 
conciliatory approach 
• Abbott may have toughed his stance 
 
 
The study ended when Abbott agreed to an 18-month moratorium on levies above 
$1000 a year and led a medical indemnity taskforce to address and resolve the 
concerns of various stakeholders.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
This study extended mass media’s traditional role as an information source in 
principal-agent relationships to establish it as a guardian of trust. Based on principal-
agency theory’s development out of corporate accountability, uncertainty and risk, 
this study showed that through the reporting and questioning of an agent’s role 
changes, the mass media can act as a guardian of trust and thus address the 
informational needs of principals.  
 
Principal-agency theory suggests three criteria for guardians of trust. The first two 
criteria, grounding in institutional norms and access to information, have long been 
met by media. This study showed support for these criteria and established that 
personal and professional information of agents, such as that contained within role 
framing, can be communicated to principals through impersonal media at very little 
cost. This finding supports the study’s proposed model and recognises Zucker’s 
(1986) argument that exchange partners must recognise the time and effort costs 
associated with direct measures of and signals for trust. Principal-agency theory 
argues that principals rely upon agents to bridge the barriers of direct physical access 
 to information and property (Shapiro 1987). Although external sources of 
information, including the media, are also used to shed light on the actions of agents, 
access to such information in a time of crisis and when an agent is new to their role 
becomes difficult. This situation increases the reliance of principals on guardians of 
trust and offers further justification for the mass media’s role as a guardian of trust. 
 
The third criterion of a guardian of trust, monitoring an agent on behalf of principals, 
was until now, a largely unexplored role for mass media. After establishing role 
expectations for the agent, the data revealed two points. First, the mass media reported 
actions of the agent against established characteristics. In cases where the mass 
media’s role frames disagreed with those established in the first working frame the 
mass media acted as a guardian of trust on behalf of principals, that is voters and 
health consumers. Second, the data revealed that the mass media projected role 
expectations for the agent. Although the timeframe for this study was short, the 
change in the agent’s roles and actions were consistent with mass media role 
projections. The influence of media in setting an agenda for the agent requires further 
investigation and must be considered in light of other influences of change such as the 
nature of the health portfolio as well as relationships between health stakeholders and 
the previous federal health minister. Further, in order for the mass media to act as a 
guardian of trust, it must hold central and balance the interests of both the agent and 
principals. This point requires further clarification in future studies that could explore 
media framing in electronic media as well as research principals’ use of mass media. 
 
Overall, this study has identified a useful alternative or addition to traditional 
guardians of trust such as contracts and regulatory bodies in principal-agent 
relationships. In principal-agency relationships, this study has shown how the mass 
media guards trust indirectly. A recent study identified that direct monitoring can 
produce conflict and distrust in some cultures (Ayios 2003). Providing the mass 
media can gain access to the relationship or exchange situation, it can act on behalf of 
principals and avoid direct interference by acting at an impersonal level. 
 
Implications for this research lie in both principal-agency theory as well as media 
theories. Research also indicates that as principal-agent relationships evolve and 
access to information improves the relative influence of trust changes (Singh & 
Sirdeshmukh 2000). A longitudinal study of the role of mass media’s reporting of 
issues would be useful to understand its influence in these relationships. The mass 
media’s role as a guardian of trust should also be considered in relation to existing 
and commonly accepted guardians of trust. Indeed the news framing of information 
from traditional guardians of trust would provide an interesting location for such a 
study. Most principal-agency studies focus on the relationship between principals and 
their agent alone. However, the mass media often reports exchanges between two 
agents who act on behalf of their opposing principals. The mass media offers an 
interesting platform from which to view and compare its ‘guardian of trust’ role 
across two agent-principal relationships. This research should also be considered in 
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